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Risk Preferences in China — Results from 
Experimental Economics* 
Alexander Haering and Timo Heinrich 
Summary 
The propensity to take risks is a fundamental trait that determines the nature of 
decision making. For example, risk taking is regarded as an important driver of 
entrepreneurial and innovative behavior in an economy. In this paper, we survey the 
empirical evidence on individual risk-taking behavior in China. We focus on those 
studies that elicit preferences for risk taking involving real monetary stakes under 
controlled conditions, using the methods of Experimental Economics. The studies 
that we summarize compare Chinese subjects to those in other countries. While non-
incentivized surveys find that Chinese subjects are more willing to take risks than 
Germans and Americans are, the existing experimental studies suggest that this 
relationship is less clear cut. 
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Introduction 
For economists, the taste for risk is a fundamental human trait that characterizes 
individual decisions taken under uncertainty. The attitude toward risk is decisive in 
many economic models, explaining, for example, educational choice, household 
savings, or health-related behavior (e. g. Bonin et al. 2007; Noussair et al. 2014; 
Felder and Mayrhofer 2011). When explaining regional differences in economic 
outcomes based on microeconomic models, it is therefore important to know 
whether local preferences differ with respect to risk. In China, risk taking is 
necessary for entrepreneurs and innovators to cope with the country’s transition — 
as pointed out by Tan (2001). Risk taking is also considered a driver of innovation 
and entrepreneurship in general (see Khilstrom and Laffont 1979 for a classical 
model, and Åstebro, et al. 2014 for a summary of empirical evidence from 
Behavioral Economics). 
Chinese people have been found to behave differently from those in Western 
countries in their strategic interactions with others (e. g. Hennig-Schmidt et al. 2008; 
Hennig-Schmidt and Walkowitz 2016). In this paper we ask whether Chinese people 
also differ systematically from those in other countries with respect to individual 
decision making. We focus specifically on their risk attitudes, and review evidence 
collected under controlled conditions using the tools of Experimental Economics. 
Nowadays, experimental methods are used by many micro- and macroeconomists. 
As Guala (2012) summarizes, the key idea of experimentation is the observation of 
events under controlled conditions. Control not only concerns variables that are 
changed by the experimenter but also the background conditions. More specifically, 
in Experimental Economics the background conditions are partly controlled by 
running the experiment in a laboratory — which allows decisions to be observed 
while controlling communication, anonymity, and incentives. Following Roth 
(1995), the aims of conducting experiments can be loosely classified into testing 
economic theories, observing regularities in human behavior, and generating policy 
advice by testing economic institutions. 
Testing theories was the most common aim of early experimental economics 
research — and it still is today. The laboratory allows the creation of decision 
situations that closely follow theoretical models; observed decisions can then be 
contrasted with theoretical predictions. Experiments that aim to uncover patterns in 
human behavior are closely linked to work on testing theories: Experiments can 
guide the development of theories in situations for which no theories exist yet, or 
they can stimulate the development of new theories that are better at explaining 
observed behavior. The work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, cf. Section 2) on 
decision making under uncertainty that led to the development of Prospect Theory 
may be the most prominent example hereof. Experiments that aim to inform 
policymakers, for example by comparing different market institutions, were 
pioneered by Smith (1991). These experiments are commonly applied in market 
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design, and have been used to study several institutions implemented  in real-world 
markets — such as online auctions (e. g. Ockenfels et al. 2006; Brosig-Koch and 
Heinrich 2014), spectrum auctions (e. g. Grimm, et al. 2003; Abbink et al. 2005), 
and entry-level labor markets (e. g. Kagel and Roth 2000; Roth, 2002). 
Recently, economic experiments have also been used to compare the behavior of 
different subject pools in different locations. The main contribution of our own 
paper is a systematic review of those experimental studies that compare the risk 
attitudes of Chinese people to those of inhabitants of other countries. As an 
additional contribution, we review different approaches to conducting cross-regional 
experiments. 
Our paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we describe some of the methods 
that are used to elicit risk preferences in experimental economics research. In the 
third section, we then explain the challenges of collecting comparable data in 
multiple locations and summarize the results of existing studies and their attempts to 
create comparability. The fourth section concludes the paper with a discussion of 
limitations and future research. 
Measuring risk preferences 
An iconic example of decision making under risk is the Saint Petersburg paradox. 
Consider a gamble that is based on a series of coin throws. If the coin comes up 
heads on the first throw, you earn one euro and the game ends. If it comes up tails on 
the first throw, the stakes are doubled and you earn two euros should it come up 
heads on the second throw. Should it come up tails, the stakes are doubled again and 
you earn four euros if it comes up heads, and so on. This gamble has an expected 
value of infinity. Therefore, if you maximize expected payoffs you should be willing 
to pay a lot of money for being allowed to play the game. Yet few people would 
actually do so. 
Bernoulli (1738) proposed a solution for this paradox and suggested that people 
maximize “moral expectation” and not expected payoffs. He suggested that the 
marginal value of money is decreasing, meaning that a wealthy person values an 
additional income of one euro much less than a poor person values the same amount. 
If people derive utility from money, this can be expressed by maximizing a utility 
function that is increasing in monetary value but has a decreasing slope. This kind of 
concave utility function implies risk aversion. For example, consider a lottery that 
either pays zero or ten euros with equal probability. Risk-averse people who own a 
ticket for this lottery will be willing to sell it for any price above five euros (the 
expected value). But because they are risk averse and the slope of their utility is 
diminishing then they will also accept a price below five euros for the ticket. How 
far below five euros, however, depends on the degree of risk aversion and the 
curvature of their utility function. In their seminal work, von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) showed that preferences obeying a set of simple axioms could 
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be expressed by maximizing a utility function of this kind (and of many other kinds 
too). 
These authors’ expected utility framework is still dominant and used in many 
economic models today, even though it cannot explain some behavioral patterns that 
have been observed when people choose between different lotteries.1 Allais (1953) 
was one of the first who pointed out systematic violations of the independence 
axiom of expected utility. Consider three lotteries A, B, and C. The independence 
axiom states that lottery A is preferred to lottery B if and only if pA+(1-p)C is 
preferred to pB+(1-p)C, where p is a probability between 0 and 1. In other words, 
making lotteries A and B each part of a new compound lottery by adding the same 
uncertainty should not alter their relative value to the decision maker. Yet as Allais 
(1953) demonstrated, it often does. Another prominent violation of the theory is the 
observation that experimental subjects exhibit preference reversals over identical 
lotteries depending on whether they can sell or buy these lotteries (Lichtenstein  and 
Slovic 1971; Lindman 1971). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed Prospect Theory, which is consistent with 
many of these behavioral patterns. It models people as valuing outcomes relative to 
a given reference point. Gains relative to this reference point are valued with an 
increasing concave value function, while losses are valued with an increasing 
convex one — in other words people are viewed as risk-averse with respect to gains, 
but risk-seeking with respect to losses. In addition, probabilities are weighed non-
objectively — meaning small probabilities are overweighed, and large ones 
underweighed. Prospect Theory is able to capture many deviations from Expected 
Utility Theory but it also has more degrees of freedom. For this reason, many 
economists still prefer the more parsimonious Expected Utility Theory. 
Despite different theoretical approaches in modeling behavior under uncertainty, 
experimentally elicited risk preferences are widely used to explain behavior in other 
decision-making situations. There is some evidence that they are predictive of field 
behavior. Anderson and Mellor (2008) observe that subjects who are more risk 
seeking in an experiment are also more likely to smoke cigarettes, drink heavily, to 
be overweight, and to not use seatbelts. Noussair et al. (2014) find risk preferences 
to be predictive of decision making with respect to the savings and portfolio choices 
of households. In addition, the answers to experimentally validated survey questions 
1  It is important to note that decision makers (outside of casinos) seldom know the exact probabilities 
of outcomes, as assumed in Expected Utility Theory (e.g. Knight, 1921). An early extension of 
Expected Utility Theory is Subjective Expected Utility Theory by Savage (1954), which does not 
rely on objectively known probabilities. It assumes people evaluate outcomes objectively, but models 
probabilities as being based on subjective evaluation. This theory is more widely applicable, but 
suffers from similar shortcomings (see the classical study by Ellsberg, 1961). To our knowledge, 
there are only two studies that compare risk preferences over lotteries with unknown probabilities 
between citizens of China and of other countries (see Vieider et al. 2015a; Vieider et al. 2015b). 
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about self-assessed risk attitudes have been found to be associated with field 
behavior. Jaeger et al. (2010) observe those who are more risk seeking to be more 
likely to migrate. Bonin et al. (2007) find those who are more risk seeking to be 
more likely to work in occupations with a high income-related risk. But the evidence 
is not clear cut. Sutter et al. (2013), for example, only find a negative correlation of 
risk aversion with body mass index but no significant correlation with savings 
behavior, smoking, or alcohol consumption in adolescents. 
Risk preferences can be measured with a variety of experimental procedures. In the 
following, we will briefly describe three popular methods that have been used in the 
papers that we survey. Our description is based on the overviews provided by 
Harrison and Rutström (2008) and Charness et al. (2013). 
Multiple price list 
The multiple price list (MPL) is one of the most commonly used such methods. 
Most prominent herein is the version by Holt and Laury (2002), but, according to 
Harrison and Rutström (2008), the very first to use this mechanism were Miller et al. 
(1969). Table 1 below shows the original price list by Holt and Laury (2002). 
Subjects typically face a list of two binary lotteries. In each row of the list they 
choose the lottery that they prefer, and one of the rows is randomly chosen and 
played to determine their payoff. 
The payoffs from the outcomes of the lotteries remain the same between rows, but 
their probabilities change. The payoffs on the left (Option A) have a lower spread 
than those on the right (Option B). Moving down from row to row, the probability of 
the larger outcome within each lottery increases while the probability of the smaller 
outcome decreases. This makes the righthand side option more attractive in terms of 
expected payoff when moving down the table (see the rightmost column). From the 
fifth row on, it is more attractive for someone who is indifferent with respect to risk 
to choose Option B. Because the spreads differ between the lotteries of both options, 
however, some people might switch earlier and some later — depending on their 
taste for risk. In fact, those who switch before the fifth row can be considered “risk 
seeking” and those who switch later as “risk averse.” The resulting switching point 
gives the experimenter an estimate of an individual’s attitude towards risk. Note, 
however, that a subject may behave inconsistently and switch multiple times. 
Another problem is that the price list induces subjects to switch in the middle of the 
table, as Harrison and Rutström (2008) point out (see Ebert and Wiesen 2014, and 
Heinrich and Mayrhofer 2014 for examples). 
  
Risk Preferences in China — Results from Experimental Economics 73 
Table 1. MPL by Holt and Laury (2002) 
Row Option A Option B 
Expected payoff 
difference 
1 1/10 of $2.00, 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85, 9/10 of $0.10 $1.17 
2 2/10 of $2.00, 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85, 8/10 of $0.10 $0.83 
3 3/10 of $2.00, 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85, 7/10 of $0.10 $0.50 
4 4/10 of $2.00, 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85, 6/10 of $0.10 $0.16 
5 5/10 of $2.00, 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85, 5/10 of $0.10 -$0.18 
6 6/10 of $2.00, 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85, 4/10 of $0.10 -$0.51 
7 7/10 of $2.00, 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85, 3/10 of $0.10 -$0.85 
8 8/10 of $2.00, 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85, 2/10 of $0.10 -$1.18 
9 9/10 of $2.00, 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85, 1/10 of $0.10 -$1.52 
10 10/10 of $2.00, 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85, 0/10 of $0.10 -$1.85 
In some versions of the MPL, one of the two options is a degenerate lottery with 
certain payoffs (see Schubert et al. 1999 for an early example). In the following, we 
denote this elicitation method as “MPL-1L” (because it only contains one 
nondegenerate lottery in each choice) and the standard Holt and Laury (2002) 
version as “MPL-2L” (because it contains two nondegenerate lotteries in each 
choice). 
Random lottery pairs 
The random lottery pairs (RLP) procedure presents subjects with a series of choices 
over two lotteries. In each choice they express their preference for one of the two 
lotteries, or, in some procedures, indifference. One of these choices is then selected 
randomly to determine the payoff. A prominent example is the study by Hey and 
Orme (1994). They confront subjects with a pair of two-outcome lotteries in each 
choice. The potential outcomes are taken from the set £0, £10, £20, and £30. The 
probabilities vary across lotteries and are displayed visually in a pie chart. This 
approach is very easy to understand, but it does not yield a clear-cut measure for 
attitude towards risk — as the switching point in the MPL does. As Harrison and 
Rutström (2008) point out, some form of statistical estimation is thus needed. 
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Figure 1. Lottery pair by Deck and Schlesinger (2014) 
 
Figure 1 gives an example from the random lottery pairs developed by Deck and 
Schlesinger (2014), which are also used in the cross-regional comparison by Haering 
et al. (2017) described in the following section. Similar to Hey and Orne (1994), the 
probabilities are displayed in a pie chart. Different from their work, however, the 
random lottery pairs by Deck and Schlesinger (2014) used to elicit risk-averse or 
risk-seeking choices are all 50–50 lotteries — that is, all outcomes are equally 
likely.2 Both lotteries have an expected value of 7 but the outcomes of the lottery on 
the left (2 and 12) have a larger spread than those on the right (10 and 4). This 
means that while a risk-neutral individual would be indifferent between both 
lotteries, every risk-averse person should in principle select the lottery on the right. 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism 
The mechanism suggested by Becker et al. (1964) (BDM) can be used to elicit 
subjects’ certainty equivalents for lotteries, meaning the amount that a subject has to 
receive with a probability of 100 percent to be willing to sell a lottery ticket that they 
own. This is a measure for risk attitude. A risk-averse subject will accept a price 
below the expected value. The more risk averse that they are, the lower this price 
will be. The mechanism works as follows: The subject owns a lottery and is 
informed about its characteristics. They also learn that a price for the lottery is 
picked at random, and that they can state the threshold at which they are willing to 
2  The lottery pairs by Deck and Schlesinger (2014) also include lotteries to measure higher-order risk 
preferences like prudence and temperance, done by combining several 50–50 lotteries. Prudent 
individuals save more when their future income becomes more risky, while temperate individuals 
invest less in risky assets when their future income becomes more risky (Kimball, 1990, 1993). 
Because in other decision pairs the outcomes of different lotteries are added up, for consistency the 
addition of payoffs (4+8 and 2+8) is also used in the simple lottery that is displayed in Figure 1. 
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sell. If the price is above that threshold, the lottery will be sold at that price and they 
will be paid accordingly. If the price is below or equal to the threshold, the subject 
keeps the lottery and plays it. This mechanism is theoretically incentive compatible, 
meaning a subject will state their true threshold because they cannot gain from 
misstating it. Yet this logic is not always apparent. In order to pick the true 
threshold, one has to realize that the final selling price does not actually depend on 
the originally stated threshold (for recent criticism, see Cason and Plott, 2014). 
Risk preferences in China 
Control in cross-regional experiments 
At first glance, conducting the same experiment in different regions, countries, or 
cultures appears a simple way to learn about behavioral differences. However, great 
care has to be taken to conduct experiments in a comparable way. Roth et al. (1991) 
ran bargaining and market experiments in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburg, and 
Tokyo. They were among the first to systematically address the following 
confounding effects that can render observations incomparable: 
Experimenter effects: If experiments in different locations are conducted by different 
experimenters, these experimenters or differences in their procedures might 
influence decisions differently. Roth et al. (1991) defined the detailed operational 
procedures that were followed by all experimenters. In addition, all experimenters 
conducted experiments in Pittsburg in order to detect pure experimenter effects. 
Language effects: If languages differ across locations, it becomes necessary to 
translate the experiment instructions. Literal translations are usually impossible 
because certain words may not exist in all languages or they may differ in their 
connotations, which might influence behavior. Roth et al. (1991) aimed to write the 
original English-language instructions in terms that could be faithfully translated 
into other languages, “avoiding terms with heavy or ambiguous connotations” 
(p. 1072). Because they ran two treatments in each country, they had some additional 
control because — if present — a translation effect would have been observed in 
both. More commonly used is the back-translation procedure (Brislin 1970). In the 
first step, the instructions in the original language are translated into another one by 
a translator. In the second step, this translation is then independently translated back 
into the original language by a different translator. In the third step, the original and 
back-translated instructions are compared in order to identify and resolve any 
discrepancies therein. 
Currency effects: Subjects in economic experiments are paid real money in order to 
provide salient incentives (Smith 1976). If subjects are paid in their local currency, 
country differences might be due to differences in the incentives that these payments 
provide. Or, they might be due to the different scales — for example if subjects 
prefer round numbers. To address the first problem, Roth et al. (1991) adjusted 
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payment amounts based on purchasing power in the respective countries. To address 
the second problem, they used “experimental currency units” — in other words, 
subjects in every country decided on the basis of the same number of tokens. These 
tokens are converted back to local currency only at the very end, when subjects are 
paid. 
Based on the study by Roth et al. (1991), Herrmann et al. (2008a, 2008b) provide a 
detailed discussion of these effects and of additional measures to counteract them. 
For example, with respect to experimenter effects, they also highlight the 
importance of ensuring subjects’ anonymity and of limiting their interaction with the 
experimenter by conducting a computerized experiment. All the effects mentioned 
are concerned with the procedures of the experiment itself. Even after these 
problems have been addressed, however, subjects are not randomly assigned to 
locations — as that would mean being assigned to different treatments of the same 
regular experiment. Differences in behavior can be due to all sorts of differences 
between the subject pools in different locations. Of course, it is impossible to find 
two subject pools that differ only with respect to their cultural background or 
country of origin. Therefore, Roth et al. (1991) are careful enough to suggest only 
that “different behavior in the different subject pools can cautiously be used as the 
basis for preliminary conjectures about cultural differences” (p. 1068, emphasis 
added). 
An additional control that has been recently applied is to conduct experiments in (at 
least) two locations within each region. This way, differences within regions can be 
compared to those between regions (see Ehmke et al. 2010; and Vieider et al. 
2015a). However, this approach does not help if a confounding factor is present in 
each and every location of a region (e.g. if recruitment procedures for subjects differ 
between countries for legal reasons). 
Nevertheless, carefully designed experiments with hypotheses based on regional 
differences have discovered interesting behavioral differences across regions. 
Ockenfels and Weimann (1999), for example, capitalized on German reunification 
to conduct experiments in the east and west of Germany. Using the same language 
and currency, they still found pronounced behavioral differences in two regions that 
had been governed by opposing political systems. They found eastern subjects to 
behave more selfishly in anonymous laboratory settings.3 To explain their findings, 
the authors argue that growing up in a socialist system may have led to solidarity 
and cooperative behavior in small non-anonymous groups and to egoism in large 
anonymous ones.  
3  See also the follow-up study by Brosig-Koch et al. (2011), which was conducted 20 years after 
German reunification. 
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Henrich et al. (2005), meanwhile, conducted ultimatum, public good, and dictator 
game experiments in 15 small-scale societies around the world. They observed 
considerable heterogeneity in behavior across these societies. They reported 
evidence that regional differences in behavior within the societies under study are 
associated with differences in market integration and the payoffs from cooperation 
in everyday life. 
Comparison of studies 
To shed light on risk preferences in the People’s Republic of China in comparison to 
in other countries, we conduct a systematic literature survey. We searched for 
studies that elicit risk preferences in China and in at least one other region. We only 
considered experimental studies, meaning those that comply with the standards of 
Experimental Economics. The main features hereof (in comparison to experimental 
research in Psychology) are the mandatory use of monetary incentives (Smith, 1976) 
and the ban on deliberately deceiving subjects (Ortmann and Hertwig, 2002). In 
addition, we only include those studies that perform statistical tests on the 
differences between countries.4 
Table 2 below summarizes, at the top, the six experimental papers that fit our 
criteria. In addition, at the bottom we list four prominent papers employing a survey 
methodology (QUE) — in other words, these studies do not elicit decisions over 
lotteries with real monetary outcomes but ask subjects to make hypothetical 
decisions in a questionnaire. The first two studies (Weber and Hsee, 1998, and Hsee 
and Weber, 1999) were the first to focus on Chinese risk preferences. The latter two 
are, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive survey studies on global 
differences with respect to risk attitudes. Regarding our research question, their 
findings exemplify the evidence from other surveys. The remaining surveys we 
found (Brumagim and Xianhua, 2005, Fan and Xiao, 2006, Lau and Ranyard, 2005, 
and Statman, 2008) all report the Chinese to be less risk averse than people from 
other countries are. 
4  We used Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com) and Ideas (http://ideas.repec.org) for a keyword 
search in order to identify relevant studies in the first round of filtering. The following keywords 
were used: risk China; risk Chinese; risk preferences China; risk preferences Chinese; risk behavior 
China; risk behavior Chinese; risk tolerance China; risk tolerance Chinese; Risikopräferenzen China; 
risk assessment China; risk cross-cultural; cross-cultural risk China; risk cross-country; risk 
preference cross-country; risk preference cross-country China; risk perception; cross-cultural risk; 
risk cross-cultural China; and, cross-cultural risk preferences. This resulted in a huge number of 
studies being discovered. In a second round of filtering, we focused on those studies that compare 
China with at least one other country. In a third step, we focused on those studies using the methods 
of Experimental Economics. In the final step, we excluded two studies that did not statistically 
compare results between countries (Bohnet et al. 2008; Bruhin et al. 2010). We nevertheless discuss 
these two in due course.  
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The second column of Table 2 below lists the countries compared in the respective 
studies. It makes clear that the United States is the most common reference point, 
followed by Germany. We therefore focus on Germany and the US in the following. 
The next three columns list the measures taken to ensure the comparability of data 
collection across locations with respect to the effects pointed out by Roth et al. 
(1991). The comparisons reveal near consensus with respect to language effects: of 
the nine studies conducted in different languages, eight use the back-translation 
method (Brislin 1970). Despite the drawbacks mentioned by Roth et al. (1991), eight 
out of ten studies opt to display varying payoffs in local currency instead of in 
experimental currency. This saves subjects from calculating actual payoffs and 
might make payoffs more salient, but it also potentially creates confounding scale 
effects. Nine out of ten studies also report how they converted payoffs between 
countries. All studies use measures that reflect the income differences between the 
respective subjective pools. However, there appears to be no consensus on the 
reference measure: some studies use the country-based purchasing power parity 
(PPP) measure while others rely on more local measures, such as the wages of 
student research assistants.  
With respect to potential experimenter effects, there appears to be even more 
heterogeneity. Only four out of nine relevant studies actually mention the approach 
taken. All of these studies relied on the support of local researchers or interpreters. 
Those by Haering et al. (2017), Rieger et al. (2014), and Falk et al. (2015) also 
relied on standardized protocols. Haering et al. (2017) are the only ones to control 
for experimenter differences, by additionally having all experimenters conduct one 
session in the same location — as advocated by Roth et al. (1991). 
In addition, Table 2 lists the general parameters of the studies that we survey. These 
use different elicitation methods, different sample sizes, and different control 
variables to capture subject pool differences. There is considerable heterogeneity 
with respect to the control variables. Ideally, researchers would include many 
demographic controls to exclude confounding subject pool differences when looking 
for cross-regional differences in behavior. Yet this also requires larger samples, 
creating additional costs. 
The last two columns of Table 2 summarize the results. The “Risk aversion” one 
lists significant differences between regions, while the “Other” column lists 
additional findings. Let us consider the survey papers first, as this methodology has 
been the standard approach used by economists and other social scientists to assess 
risk attitudes for many years now. The three survey studies that compare China 
directly to other countries find Chinese people to be less risk averse than Germans 
and Americans are. In this respect, they are similar to other surveys not included in 
Table 2 (Brumagim and Xianhua 2005; Fan and Xiao 2006; Lau and Ranyard, 2005, 
and Statman 2008). 
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The fourth mentioned survey study was recently conducted by Falk, Becker, et al. 
(2015). It is the first study to assess risk preferences (as well as other characteristics 
of human decision making) in representative samples using an experimentally 
validated survey measure. This means that the authors also conducted another study 
(as described in Falk et al. 2016) in which survey answers were compared to the 
choices made with real monetary stakes by the same subjects. This allows for the 
selection of survey questions that are highly correlated with the choices made when 
actual money is involved. 
The drawback of their approach is that the cross-regional comparison of risk 
preferences is only valid if the correlation between imagined and real choices is 
similar across regions. Vieder et al. (2015b) find that the correlation between survey 
questions and incentivized measures in fact varies across countries. As they point 
out, the correlation is significantly positive in 19 to 29 of the 30 countries that they 
cover (depending on the question and on the domain of payoffs). This might explain 
why survey questions have been found to correlate with experimentally elicited 
measures of risk aversion by some (Dohmen et al. 2011 and Falk et al. 2016) but not 
all authors (Anderson and Mellor, 2009, Lönnqvist et al. 2011). 
Falk et al. (2015) do not directly compare risk preferences across countries. Instead, 
they correlate the average risk attitude in 76 countries with other characteristics of 
these countries. They find the degree of risk aversion to be significantly and 
positively correlated with life expectancy, less inequality (as measured by the Gini 
coefficient), and the higher rigidity of employment laws. It is weakly significantly 
correlated with a larger level of redistribution (measured as the share of government 
transfers of national income) and a lower number of homicides. There is no 
significant correlation with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita or the degree of 
institutionalized democracy.5 
Let us now consider the experimental studies that collect decisions made over real 
monetary stakes. Even though we list six experimental papers, the results are only 
drawn from five datasets — because Vieider et al. (2015a) consider a subset of the 
data presented in Vieider et al. (2015b). In three of the five datasets, the respective 
authors find differences in line with the results of the survey studies: Ehmke et al. 
(2010) find Chinese participants to be less risk averse than those in the French and 
American subject pools are. Vieider et al. (2015b) find Chinese participants to be 
5  Falk et al. (2015) do not provide a direct comparison of risk preferences in China and in other 
countries. However, based on the correlations that they provide one can derive an ordering of risk 
preferences: When comparing China to the US and Germany, for example, we would expect Chinese 
people to be the least risk averse based on life expectancy, Gini coefficient and redistribution of 
GDP. Based on labor regulations and the number of homicides per capita, we would expect 
Americans to be the least risk averse. 
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less risk averse than German ones.6 Haering et al. (2017) find Chinese participants 
to be less risk averse than American and German ones. However, in the remaining 
two experimental datasets (Kachelmeier and Shehata 1992, and Liu, Meng, et al. 
2014), the authors find no significant differences between locations. These results 
make clear that Chinese participants cannot be unequivocally regarded as less risk 
averse than German and American ones, as the previous survey evidence suggests. 
These findings also highlight that more research is needed to analyze why 
hypothetical decisions differ from real ones in a variety of ways across countries.7 
Two further studies have experimentally elicited risk preferences in China and in 
other countries but are not listed in Table 2. Bohnet et al. (2008), on the one hand, 
compare the attitude toward risk in situations where nature resolves uncertainty to 
the attitude toward risk in situations in which another person resolves it. They find 
people in Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey and the US to be “betrayal 
averse”, meaning that they prefer risks in which uncertainty is resolved by nature. 
They also elicit risk preferences in each country, but do not compare them directly. 
They compare each country to the sample mean, finding only subjects in Oman to be 
more risk averse than the average. Bruhin et al. (2010), on the other hand, conduct 
experiments in two locations in Switzerland and two in China. They are interested in 
identifying behavioral types, so they do not directly compare risk attitudes between 
countries or between locations. In both countries they find that roughly 80 percent of 
subjects can be classified as behaving consistent with Prospect Theory, while the 
remaining subjects maximize expected values. However, they point out that some of 
the Prospect Theory-type subjects in China strongly overweigh gain and underweigh 
loss probabilities — which could explain a general tendency to be less risk averse. 
6  In the case of lotteries with unknown probabilities (cf. Footnote 1), Vieider et al.  (2015b, online 
appendix) find Chinese people to be less risk averse than both Americans and Germans.  
7  Also note that Vieider et al. (2015a) report only very small within-country differences in China and 
in Ethiopia, while Ehmke, Lusk and Tyner (2010) make a similar observation in the US. 
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Table 2. Comparison of studies 
 
1:  CA: Canada; CN: People’s Republic of China; DE: Germany; ET: Ethiopia; FR: France; NE: Niger; 
PL: Poland; TW: Taiwan; US: United States of America. 
2:  BDM: Becker-DeGroot-Marschak; MPL-1L: Multiple Price List one lottery; MPL-2L: Multiple Price 
List two lotteries; QUE: Questionnaires, RLP: Random Lottery Pairs. 
3:  BNT: Berlin Numeracy Test; CRT: Cognitive Reflection Test; Econ: Economics; IRB form: In the 
US, subjects need to be presented with a form by the Institutional Review Board for experiments 
with human subjects beforehand; Math: Mathematics; Major: Major field of study; Stats: Statistics; 
UBS Prices & Earnings 2014, available online at: www.ubs.com/pricesandearnings. 
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Table 2. (continued) 
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Conclusion 
We started out with the aim of assessing the risk attitude of Chinese people in 
comparison to the inhabitants of other countries. Most commonly, survey studies 
have been used to compare risk attitudes across countries. These studies are based 
on choices over hypothetical stakes. Virtually all of them find a higher propensity of 
Chinese participants to take risks relative to American or German participants. 
However, in Experimental Economics we are interested in preferences over actual 
monetary outcomes. If we want to draw conclusions about these types of preference 
based on survey studies using hypothetical outcomes, we have to assume that 
choices over hypothetical outcomes correlate with choices over monetary ones too 
— but this is not always the case, as observed by Vieider et al. (2015b). When 
comparing answers across countries, we also have to assume that this correlation is 
similar.  
However, with respect to China, it is not always clear that instruments for empirical 
data collection that have been developed in Western countries can be readily 
transferred to that national context (see Roy et al. 2001 and Stening and Zhang 2007 
for overviews). For example, there appears to be evidence for a tendency of Chinese 
respondents to choose midpoints on Likert scales in questionnaires (Shenkar 1994). 
The experimental studies that are based on choices over real monetary stakes 
suggest that differences in preferences are less clear: three studies find Chinese 
people to be less risk averse than Germans or Americans are, while two studies find 
no significant differences between them. 
However, not all of the studies that we cover can be readily compared because of 
their varying designs. For example, several reported studies display the varying 
payoffs in local currency which might lead to confounding scale effects. For a more 
extensive discussion of how differences in experimental design may account for 
differences in behavior, see Goerg et al. (2016). It is also possible that our 
comparison of studies is confounded by regional differences within countries, or by 
changes in risk attitudes over time. We have not focused on the last point in this 
paper. Yet macroeconomic conditions have been found to influence decision making 
under risk (e. g. Browne, Jaeger, et al. 2015, Cohn, Engelmann, et al. 2015), and 
these conditions have changed quite dramatically in China in recent decades. Also 
note that the number of experimental studies comparing the risk preferences of the 
Chinese to those of other peoples is relatively small. If more data becomes available, 
a quantitative meta-analysis would be the next step.8 
8  In our review, we only considered individual decision making. Yet cross-regional experimental 
studies comparing behavior in strategic interactions in Western and Eastern countries generally 
observe a high degree of dissimilarity (see, for example, Oosterbeek, et al. 2004). By exploring the 
negotiation behavior of teams from China and Germany, for example, Hennig-Schmidt and 
Walkowitz (2016) observe that the latter put great weight on fairness issues and try to reach an 
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In general, our overview summarizes the popular design approaches taken in cross-
regional experiments. It highlights the importance of general standards, such as the 
back-translation procedure, for the comparability of results. One method that is not 
widely used yet is to run experiments in different locations within the same region, 
as a control. This is a promising approach because it allows research to compare 
within-region differences to between-region ones. Due to their cost, experiments are 
usually restricted to small samples from student subject pools. One alternative to 
experimental studies are experimentally validated survey measures. These can be 
applied to representative samples more efficiently. However, their contribution with 
respect to risk preferences over real monetary stakes is based on a rather strong 
assumption: the validation that took place in one country is assumed to hold true 
within all countries under study. 
Even if risk preferences are found to differ systematically between individuals or 
regions, little is known at present about the underlying drivers thereof. Often 
variations in risk preferences are attributed to cultural differences between countries. 
For example, Hsee and Weber (1999) found that Chinese people are more likely to 
take risks than Americans are when deciding over hypothetical payoffs. They 
explain their finding by the much lower individualism in China relative to in the US, 
which was also observed by Hofstede (1980). Based on the “cushion hypothesis” 
people from China are therefore less likely than those from the US to deal with the 
consequences of risky decisions on their own.  
Hofstede (1980) originally identified four dimensions that characterize a culture: 
power distance, individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty 
avoidance has also been reported to be associated with risk taking. A higher degree 
of uncertainty avoidance means that members of a society try harder to avoid 
situations with high uncertainties. This is not synonymous with risk aversion, 
however. Instead, people might also take additional risks to avoid ambiguity — that 
is, situations in which the probabilities of outcomes are not known. Nevertheless, in 
their own survey Rieger et al. (2015) observe that more uncertainty avoidance is 
associated with less risk taking. However, with respect to uncertainty avoidance 
China differs less from Western countries — for example the US ranks 57th and 
China 63rd out of the 69 countries that were surveyed (Hofstede et al. 2010). 
It has also been observed that risk preferences are transmitted from one generation 
to the next (Dohmen et al. 2012), and that they are at least partly genetically 
determined (Cesarini et al. 2009). Quite recent observations by Becker et al. (2015) 
suggest that differences in risk preferences between countries (elicited through 
representative surveys) can be explained by genetic and migratory distance. Their 
acceptable payoff within a reasonable timeframe. In contrast, teams from China try to collect as much 
information on their negotiation partners as possible so as to anticipate their behavior. 
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results also highlight the importance of environmental factors, including the 
prevailing institutions for the shaping of risk preferences (see also, Callen et al. 2014 
and Browne et al. 2016).  
Given the rapid change in living conditions as well as in the institutional 
environment in China, it thus remains to be seen how risk preferences develop along 
economic and cultural parameters there. In future, longitudinal studies that combine 
experiments (or experimentally validated survey measures) with representative 
samples will help to disentangle the different drivers of decision making under 
uncertainty. The observation of behavior over time could inform new theories to 
help explain individual decision making. As an important application, such data may 
also be able to help explain regional differences in innovativeness and its 
development. 
References 
Abbink, Klaus; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Pezanis-Christou, Paul; Rockenbach, Bettina; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; 
Selten, Reinhard (2005): “An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS 
auction”, in: European Economic Review, 49: 505–530 
Allais, Maurice (1953): ”Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats 
et axiomes de l’ecole americaine”, in :  Econometrica, 21:  503–546 
Anderson, Lisa R.; Mellor, Jennifer M. (2008): “Predicting health behaviors with an experimental 
measure of risk preference”, in: Journal of Health Economics, 27.5: 1260–1274 
— (2009): “Are risk preferences stable? Comparing an experimental measure with a validated survey-
based measure”, in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 39.2: 137–160 
Åstebro, Thomas; Herz, Holger; Nanda, Ramana; Weber, Roberto A. (2014): “Seeking the roots of 
entrepreneurship: insights from behavioral economics”, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28.3: 
49–69 
Becker, Anke; Enke, Benjamin; Falk, Armin (2015): “The ancient origins of the cross-country 
heterogeneity in risk preferences”. https://www.cens.uni-bonn.de/team/board/armin-falk/falk-risk-
sent.pdf (accessed 2016-03-30) 
Becker, Gordon M.; DeGroot, Morris H.; Marschak, Jacob (1964): “Measuring utility by a single-
response sequential method”, in: Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 9: 226–232 
Bernoulli, Daniel (1738): “Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis”, in: Commentarii Academiae 
Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae, 5: 175–192 
Bohnet, Iris; Greig, Fiona; Herrmann, Benedikt; Zeckhauser, Richard (2008): “Betrayal aversion: 
Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States”, in: The American 
Economic Review, 98.1: 294–310 
Bonin, Holger; Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe (2007): “Cross-sectional 
earnings risk and occupational sorting: The role of risk attitudes”, in: Labour Economics, 14.6: 926–
937 
Brislin, Richard W. (1970): “Back-translation for cross-cultural research”, in: Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 1.3: 185–216 
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Helbach, Christoph; Ockenfels, Axel; Weimann, Joachim (2011): “Still different 
after all these years: Solidarity behavior in East and West Germany”, in: Journal of Public 
Economics, 95.11: 1373–1376 
Brosig‐Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo (2014): “Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement 
auctions: An experiment”, in: Production and Operations Management, 23.2: 210–220 
Browne, Mark J.; Jaeger, Verena; Steinorth, Petra (2015): “Impact of economic conditions on individual 
risk attitude”, SSRN 2631066 
Browne, Mark J.; Jaeger, Verena; Richter, Andreas; Steinorth, Petra (2016): “Familiy transitions and risk 
attitude”, in: MRIC Working Paper No. 32 
Bruhin, Adrian; Fehr‐Duda, Helga; Epper, Thomas (2010): “Risk and rationality: Uncovering 
heterogeneity in probability distortion”, in: Econometrica, 78.4: 1375–1412 
Alexander Haering and Timo Heinrich 86 
Brumagim, Alan L.; Xianhua, Wu (2005): “An examination of cross-cultural differences in attitudes 
towards risk: Testing prospect theory in the People's Republic of China”, in: Multinational Business 
Review, 13.3: 67–86 
Callen, Michael; Isaqzadeh, Mohammad; Long, James D.; Sprenger, Charles (2014): “Violence and risk 
preference: Experimental evidence from Afghanistan”, in: American Economic Review, 104.1: 123–
148 
Cason, Timothy N.; Plott, Charles R. (2014): “Misconceptions and game form recognition: challenges to 
theories of revealed preference and framing.” Journal of Political Economy, 122.6: 1235–1270 
Cesarini, David; Dawes, Christopher T.; Johannesson, Magnus; Lichtenstein, Paul; Wallace, Björn 
(2009): “Genetic variation in preferences for giving and risk taking”, in: Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, May 2009: 809–842 
Charness, Gary; Gneezy, Uri; Imas, Alex (2013): “Experimental methods: Eliciting risk preferences”, in: 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 87: 43–51 
Cohn, Alain; Engelmann, Jan; Fehr, Ernst; Maréchal, Michel A. (2015): “Evidence for countercyclical 
risk aversion: an experiment with financial professionals”, in: American Economic Review, 105.2: 
860–885 
Deck, Cary; Schlesinger, Harris (2014): “Consistency of higher order risk preferences”, in: Econometrica, 
82.5: 1913–1943 
Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe; Schupp, Jürgen; Wagner, Gert G. (2011): 
“Individual risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences”, in: Journal of 
the European Economic Association, 9.3: 522–550 
Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Sunde, Uwe (2012): “The intergenerational transmission of risk and trust 
attitudes”, in: Review of Economic Studies, 72: 645–677 
Ebert, Sebastian; Wiesen, Daniel (2014): “Joint measurement of risk aversion, prudence, and 
temperance”, in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 48.3: 231–252 
Ehmke, Mariah; Lusk, Jayson; Tyner, Wallace (2010): “Multidimensional tests for economic behavior 
differences across cultures”, in: Journal of Socio-Economics, 39.1: 37–45 
Ellsberg, Daniel (1961): “Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
75: 643–669 
Falk, Armin, Becker, Anke, Dohmen, Thomas; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe (2016): “The preference 
survey module: A validated instrument for measuring risk, time, and social preferences.”, in: IZA 
Discussion Paper (9674) 
Falk, Armin; Becker, Anke; Dohmen, Thomas; Enke, Benjamin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe (2015): 
“The nature and predictive power of preferences: Global Evidence”, in: IZA Discussion Paper (9504) 
Fan, Jessie X.; Xiao, Jing Jian (2006): “A cross-cultural study in risk tolerance: Comparing Chinese and 
Americans”, in: Journal of Personal Finance, 5.3: 54–75 
Felder, Stefan; Mayrhofer, Thomas (2011): Medical decision making: A health economic primer. 
Heidelberg: Springer Science & Business Media 
Goerg, Sebastian J.; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari; Winter, Eyal (2016): “In wrong 
anticipation-miscalibrated beliefs between Germans, Israelis, and Palestinians”, in:  PLoS One, 11.6, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0156998  
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar (2003): “Low price equilibrium in multiunit 
auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany”, in: International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 21: 1557–1569 
Guala, Francesco (2012): “Experimentation in economics”, in: Mäki, U. (ed.): Philosophy of Economics 
(Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, 13). Oxford, UK and Amsterdam: Elsevier, 597–640 
Haering, Alexander; Heinrich, Timo; Mayrhofer, Thomas (2017): “Exploring the consistency of higher-
order risk preferences”, in: Ruhr Economics Papers #688 
Harrison, Glenn W.; Rutström, Elisabet E. (2008): “Risk aversion in the laboratory”, in: Cox, James C.; 
Harrison, Glenn W. (eds.): Risk Aversion in Experiments (Research in Experimental Economics, 12). 
Bingley: Emerald, 41–196  
Heinrich, Timo; Mayrhofer, Thomas (2014): “Higher-order risk preferences in social settings”, in: Ruhr 
Economic Paper #508 
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Li, Zhu-Yu; Yang, Chaoliang (2008): “Why people reject advantageous offers – 
Non-monotonic strategies in ultimatum bargaining: Evaluating a video experiment run in PR China”, 
in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65.2: 373–384 
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Walkowitz, Gari (2016): “Negotiations among Chinese and Germans – An 
experimental case study”, in: Homo Oeconomicus, 32.3/4: 451–488 
Henrich, Joseph; Boyd, Robert; Bowles, Samuel; Camerer, Colin; Fehr, Ernst; Gintis, Herbert; 
McElreath, Richard; Alvard, Michael; Barr, Abigail; Ensminger, Jean; Henrich, Natalie S.; Hill, 
Risk Preferences in China — Results from Experimental Economics 87 
Kim; Gil-White, Francisco; Gurven, Michael; Marlowe, Frank W.; Patton, John Q.; Tracer, David 
(2005): “‘Economic man’ in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale 
societies”, in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28.6: 795–815 
Herrmann, Benedikt; Thöni, Christian; Gächter, Simon (2008a): “Antisocial punishment across 
societies”, in: Science, 319.5868: 1362–1367 
— (2008b): “Antisocial punishment across societies”, in: Science, 319.5868: Supplementary Material 
Hey, John D.; Orme, Chris (1994): “Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using 
experimental data”, in: Econometrica, 62.6: 1291–1326 
Holt, Charles A.; Laury, Susan K. (2002): “Risk aversion and incentive effects”, in: American Economic 
Review, 92.5: 1644–1655 
Hsee, Christopher K.; Weber, Elke U. (1999): “Cross-national differences in risk preference and lay 
predictions”, in: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12: 165–179 
Hofstede, Geert (1980): Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. 
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 
Hofstede, Geert; Hofstede, Gert J.; Minkov, Michael (2010): Cultures and Organizations - Software of 
the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival (Business Skills and 
Development). London: McGraw-Hill 
Jaeger, David A.; Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe.; Bonin, Holger (2010): 
“Direct evidence on risk attitudes and migration”, in: Review of Economics and Statistics, 92.3: 684–
689 
Kagel, John H.; Roth, Alvin E. (2000): “The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A 
laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 
201–235 
Kachelmeier, Steven J.; Shehata, Mohamed (1992): “Examining risk preferences under high monetary 
incentives: Experimental evidence from the People's Republic of China”, in: American Economic 
Review, 82.5: 1120–1141 
Kahneman, Daniel; Tversky, Amos (1979): “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk”, in: 
Econometrica, 47: 263–291 
Khilstrom, Richard E.; Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1979): “A general equilibrium entrepreneurial theory of 
firm formation based on risk aversion”, in: Journal of Political Economy, 87.4: 719–748 
Kimball, Miles S. (1990): “Precautionary saving in the small and in the large”, in: Econometrica, 58.1: 
53–73 
— (1992): “Precautionary motives for holding assets”, in: Newman, P.; Milgate, M.; Falwell, J. (eds.): 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance. London: MacMillan, 158–161 
Knight, Frank H. (1921): Risk, uncertainty and proﬁt. New York: Hart, Schaffner and Marx 
Lau, Lai-Yin; Ranyard, Rob (2005): “Chinese and English probabilistic thinking and risk taking in 
gambling”, in: Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36.5: 621–627 
Lichtenstein, Sarah; Slovic, Paul (1971): “Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling 
decisions”, in: Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89.1: 46–55 
Lindman, Harold R. (1971): “Inconsistent preferences among gambles”, in: Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 89.2: 390–397 
Liu, Elaine M.; Meng, Juanjuan; Wang, Joseph T. Y. (2014): “Confucianism and preferences: Evidence 
from lab experiments in Taiwan and China”, in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 104: 
106–122 
Lönnqvist, Jan-Erik; Verkasalo, Markku; Walkowitz, Gari (2011): “It pays to pay – Big Five personality 
influences on co-operative behavior in an incentivized and hypothetical prisoner’s dilemma game”, 
in: Personality and Individual Differences, 50.2: 300–304 
Miller, Louis; Meyer, David E.; Lanzetta, John T. (1969): “Choice among equal expected value 
alternatives: Sequential effects of winning probability level on risk preferences”, in: Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 79.3: 419–423 
Noussair, Charles N.; Trautmann, Stefan T.; Van de Kuilen, Gijs (2014): “Higher order risk attitudes, 
demographics, and financial decisions”, in: Review of Economic Studies, 81.1: 325–355 
Ockenfels, Axel; Reiley, David; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim (2006): “Online auctions”, in: Hendershott, T. 
(ed.): Handbooks in Information Systems, vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 571–628 
Ockenfels, Axel; Weimann, Joachim (1999): “Types and patterns: An experimental East-West-German 
comparison of cooperation and solidarity”, in: Journal of Public Economics, 71: 275–287 
Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sloof, Randolph; Van De Kuilen, Gijs (2004): “Cultural differences in ultimatum 
game experiments: Evidence from a meta-analysis”, in: Experimental Economics, 7.2: 171–188 
Ortmann, Andreas; Hertwig, Ralph (2002): “The costs of deception: Evidence from psychology”, in: 
Experimental Economics, 5.2: 111–131 
Alexander Haering and Timo Heinrich 88 
Rieger, Marc O.; Wang, Mei; Hens, Thorsten (2014): “Risk preferences around the world”, in: 
Management Science, 61.3: 637–648 
Roth, Alvin E. (1995): “Bargaining experiments”, in:  Kagel, John H.; Roth, Alvin E. (eds.): Handbook of 
Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 254–348 
— (2002): “The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for 
design economics”, in: Econometrica, 70: 1341–1378 
Roth, Alvin E.; Prasnikar, Vesna; Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro; Zamir, Shmuel (1991): “Bargaining and 
market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study”, in: 
American Economic Review, 81.5: 1068–1095 
Roy, Abhik; Walters, Peter G.; Luk, Sherriff T. (2001): “Chinese puzzles and paradoxes: Conducting 
business research in China”, in: Journal of Business Research, 52.2: 203–210 
Savage, Leonard J. (1954): The Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley Publications in Statistics  
Schubert, Renate; Brown, Martin; Gysler, Matthias; Brachinger, Hans W. (1999): “Financial decision-
making: Are women really more risk-averse?”, in: American Economic Review, 89.2: 381–385 
Shenkar, Oded (1994): “The People’s Republic of China: Raising the bamboo screen through 
international management research”, in: International Studies of Management & Organization, 24.1–
2: 9–34 
Smith, Vernon L. (1976): “Experimental economics: Induced value theory”, in: American Economic 
Review, 66.2: 274–279 
— (1991): Papers in Experimental Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Statman, Meir (2008): “Countries and culture in behavioral finance”, in: CFA Institute Conference 
Proceedings Quarterly, 25.3: 38–44 
Stening, Bruce W.; Zhang, Marina Y. (2007): “Methodological challenges confronted when conducting 
management research in China”, in: International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 7.1: 121–
142 
Sutter, Matthias; Kocher, Martin G.; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Trautmann, Stefan T. (2013): “Impatience 
and uncertainty: Experimental decisions predict adolescents' field behavior”, in: American Economic 
Review 103.1: 510–531 
Tan, Justin (2001): “Innovation and risk-taking in a transitional economy: A comparative study of 
Chinese managers and entrepreneurs”, in: Journal of Business Venturing, 16.4: 359–376 
Vieider, Ferdinand M.; Chmura, Thorsten; Fisher, Tyler; Kusakawa, Takao; Martinsson, Peter; 
Thompson, Frauke M.; Sunday, Adewara (2015a): “Within-versus between-country differences in 
risk attitudes: implications for cultural comparisons”, in: Theory and Decision, 78.2: 209–218 
Vieider, Ferdinand M.; Lefebvre, Mathieu; Bouchouicha, Ranoua; Chmura, Thorsten; Hakimov, 
Rustamdjan; Krawczyk, Michal; Martinsson, Peter (2015b): “Common components of risk and 
uncertainty attitudes across contexts and domains: Evidence from 30 countries”, in: Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 13.3: 421–452 
Von Neumann, John; Morgenstern, Oskar (1944): Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
Weber, Elke U.; Hsee, Christopher (1998): “Cross-cultural differences in risk perception but cross-
cultural similarities in attitudes towards perceived risk”, in: Management Science, 44.9: 1205–1217 
